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Conatus, the Will to Persist: An 
Introduction
Abstract
The papers collected in this issue address a variety of aspects of the concept of conatus 
ranging from the explorations of its roots in early ancient Greek thought to its application 
on modern theories of democratic education. The conatus is a special relation between 
the parts of a monad and their subparts and the subparts of the subparts to infinity, 
which ensures that each part and subpart is a part of this monad and not of any other. 
As a fundamental trait of monadic existence, the conatus is manifested in a multiplicity 
of facets that sustain the persistence of any real existence. It is thus obvious that there is 
still a vast field of such manifestations of conatus that awaits philosophical exploration, 
especially in the realms of Social Ontology and of the Philosophy of Nature.
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I. Conatus and monadic existence
Since its explicit re-introduction
1 in modern philosophy in the 17th centu-
ry, the concept of conatus has been formulated in as many versions as 
there are philosophical endeavours regarding the nature of a living resp. 
thinking monadic existence, be it conceived as a Cartesian Ego, a Spinozist 
1 The concept of conatus has its origins in the ancient Greek thought. Cf. the papers of Bagby, 
Egbekpalu and Kirby in this issue.
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Divine thought, a Leibnitzian Monad, a Hegelian Subject, a McTaggartian Self, 
or a Heideggerian Dasein.
Monadological theories of existence are the best explanations of the 
phenomena associated with personality or personal existence because they 
are monistic without being reductionist and incorporate the idea of spirit 
or thinking without recourse to complicated theories of emergence. This 
explanatory superiority of monadological theories is due to the concept of 
monadic existence’s ability to combine both the ideas of the one and the 
many – or the ideas of common and separate – without creating a contra-
diction.
The rough framework of any monadological ontology is thus a system 
of discrete units that nevertheless are interconnected by their own intrinsic 
characteristics. To form such a system, a monad must have a very special 
internal structure that allows for both the absolute separateness of that 
monad from any other monad and the formation of an external interrela-
tionship between the monads: A monad is considered a simple entity – that 
is, an entity that is not composed of detachable parts. A monad, however, 
is neither punctual nor atomic (i.e., indivisible). A monad consists of an 
infinite number of parts that are of the same nature as the monad itself; 
each part consists also of an infinite number of parts that are of the same 
nature as the higher parts and the whole monad (i.e., infinitely divisible). 
The infinite divisibility of a monad is one necessary condition to the unity of 
the monad so that the parts of one monad belong only to that monad and 
not to any other monad; thus, each monad is absolutely and profoundly 
separated from every other monad. Only then is it possible that the monad 
exists as a discrete unit.
The unity of the monad, however, requires a second condition: a special 
relation between the parts of the monad and their subparts and the subparts 
of the subparts to infinity, which ensures that each part and subpart is a part 
of this monad and not of any other. This relationship, which connects all 
parts of the monad and ensures its internal unity, is manifested as activity 
because the monad is an active unit. This activity traditionally has been 
termed the conatus of the monad.
The active monad possesses another active feature that is oriented to-
wards the other monads and aims to integrate them into its own nature. 
This second form of activity is traditionally called perception.
All conceptual variants of conatus employed in monadological theories 
of existence have in common the idea that the conatus manifests itself as 
‘striving,’ or as ‘will’ to persist. Some philosophers, however, have expand-
ed this concept to the realm of lifeless and non-thinking matter creating the 
concept of inertia. Inertia as the tendency of a lifeless and inactive body to 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 31/12/2021 12:08:35 |
[ 11 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 6, ISSUE 2 • 2021
adhere passively to a given state of motion is then the differentia specifica 
that divides the realm of the existent into two ‘species’: The active and 
perceiving monads strictu sensu and the passive and inert units of matter.2
Yet, the inert units of matter cannot obviously interact actively via mu-
tual perceptions. Since their only ‘activity’ consists in the change of their 
relative positions, i.e., in their motions, they interact only by collisions that 
are governed by physical conservation laws.3 The expansion of the concept 
of conatus to the passive concept of inertia raises interesting metaphysical 
questions regarding the relationship of spirit and matter that cannot pursued 
here. However, since the interactions of the units of matter are somehow per-
ceived by the active conative monads and are thus part of their experienced 
reality, we can safely assume that the world does not consist of two distinct 
and unrelated realms, and we can also reject the thesis that the relationship 
between conatus and inertia is merely heuristic.4
II. Conatus: Revisiting and expanding the concept
The papers collected in this issue address a variety of aspects of the concept 
of conatus ranging from the explorations of its roots in early ancient Greek 
thought to its application on modern theories of democratic education.
a. Revisiting the origins – Conatus as the impulse of nature
In his essay The Organic Roots of Conatus in Early Greek Thought, Christopher 
Kirby reflects on the “earliest Greek treatments of impulse, motivation, and 
self-animation,”5 and how they inspired later developments of this “cluster 
of concepts tied to the hormé-conatus concept.”6 Kirby begins with an ex-
position of the change that the conception of physis underwent over time. 
The Greek concept of hormé (ὁρμή) thus “posited an inherent impulse from 
which all motion”7 emanated. Roman thinkers then associated physis with the 
Latin natura, Kirby continues, and hormé with conatus essendi. Yet, although 
they “largely lacked the same implicit growth-principle” Kirby argues, they 
2 In modern physics these units are not any more the classical Newtonian corpuscular atoms 
but have a complicated structure that is described in Quantum Physics.
3 In this broad sense every physical interaction that is governed by a conservation law is a kind 
of collision.
4 Cf. Épaminondas Vamboulis, “Le principe d’inertie et le conatus du corps,” Astérion 3 (2005): 
105-124.
5 Christopher Kirby, “The Organic Roots of Conatus in Early Greek Thought,” Conatus – Jour-
nal of Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2021): 29-49.
6 Ibid., 31.
7 Ibid., 30.
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still made “heavy reference”8 to the concepts of conatus and impetus. Some 
“notion of self-animation” remained crucial, also throughout the medieval 
period, over Early Modern thinkers, up to late German idealism, Kirby con-
tinues. He goes so far to say that the hormé-conatus concept “is one of the 
most successful memes in the history of philosophy.”9 Kirby argues that one 
reason for the success of the concept may lie in its ability to address “a long-
standing philosophical problem,” namely “the reconciliation of permanence 
and change.”10 
Kirby then in detail outlines the history of the concept of hormé-conatus 
in Early Greek thought, beginning with Homer’s treatment, especially in the 
Odyssey, over Hesiod, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles. 
He closes with a discussion of Sarah Broadie’s contribution to the question 
of how to account for the “underlying causes for the human impulse to phi-
losophize,”11 and the role that education plays here. Philosophical education 
“collapses” if it is excessively focused on “nurture[ing] an individual’s growth 
towards singular ends, in a linear fashion,” Kirby argues here. Both “Homer’s 
Odysseus” and “Plato’s philosopher king” are alike in that their “impulses 
toward longer-term, more sustainable good” can override their “impulses to-
wards instant gratification,”12 the author points out.
b. The prefiguration of conatus in the Aristotelian thought
John R. Bagby’s Aristotle and Aristoxenus on Effort examines the roots of 
the concept of conatus in Aristotle’s thought, more specifically, the connec-
tions between Aristotle’s understanding of “life as an internal experience of 
living force”13 and the conatus doctrine. He argues that both Spinoza and 
Aristotle agree that effort is not possessed “innately,” but instead “emerg-
es gradually by an effort aimed at improvement.”14 Although Aristotle does 
not have one single term to refer to striving, Bagby argues that the concept 
is still “prefigured” in Aristotle’s understanding of “life, experience, and 
energeia, as an interiority of effort.”15 Bagby here sees a continuity from 
Aristotle’s concept to both early modern and early 20th century thought, 
8 Ibid.




13 John R. Bagby, “Aristotle and Aristoxenus on Effort,” Conatus – Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 
2 (2021): 51-74.
14 Ibid., 51.
15 Ibid., 52. 
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such as in Bergson’s attention to life, Heidegger’s “care structure,” and 
Deleuze’s concept of “intensity.”16 All these concepts share a commitment 
to an “internal principle of causality,”17 as we find it in Spinoza’s notion of 
conatus. All of them, Bagby furthermore argues, are ultimately “consonant 
with Aristotle’s dynamic sense of effort.”18 The mere fact that Aristotle un-
derstood the definition of the soul as a geometric task, as Bagby puts it, did 
not automatically imply a static conception of the soul, instead, Aristotle 
argued for the need of a “dynamic” definition of the soul. Such a definition 
must “include and display the cause,” which Bagby understands to refer to 
the “successive emergence of powers.”19
Bagby then moves on to discuss the role that effort plays in ethics gen-
erally, and how it is related, in particular, to pleasure, attention and virtue. 
He argues here that Aristotle “presents an ethics of effort.”20 Although 
progress and development require effort, they are “sustained by pleasures 
that gradually increase the facility and ease of action,”21 they require habit, 
which makes them pleasant. One example of “dynamic effort” that Bagby 
then explicitly addresses it that of music. It is both a “deliberate skillful ac-
tion” and a “means of relaxation and amusement that releases tension.”22 
Attending to the music, is “work of the soul.”23 Continuous exercise “pro-
gressively increases the richness of its contents,” it is thus the action of a 
“concrete conatus,”24 one that is can only be explicated “by reference to 
the effort of the soul.”25
c. Further on the Aristotelian tracks: Happiness and conatus
In Aristotelian Concept of Happiness (Eudaimonia) and its Conative Role in 
Human Existence: A Critical Evaluation, Purissima Emelda Egbekpalu criti-











26 Purissima Emelda Egbekpalu, “Aristotelian Concept of Happiness and its Conative Role in 
Human Existence: A Critical Evaluation,” Conatus – Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2021): 
75-86.
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She ultimately argues that to “sustain man’s inner drive to persist in life,” 
happiness ought to be “restricted to only cognitive activities.”27 
On Aristotle’s understanding, Egbekpalu begins, “the pursuit of happi-
ness presupposes an inner drive of continuous striving towards good moral 
character.”28 When it comes to the “conative role” of happiness in human 
existence, both the “activity of the soul,” and desires and emotions related to 
the “attainment of happiness” are thus relevant, Egbekpalu continues. Hap-
piness in Aristotle “denotes the good life,29 and is a “lifetime endeavour.”30 
Although we do not find any notion of conatus before the Stoics, Egbekpalu 
argues that we can still find related ideas in Aristotle’s writing on “happiness, 
human soul, emotions, and rhetoric.”31 “The drive to attain happiness,” Eg-
bekpalu points out is the “focal point” of all human striving in Aristotle.32 
This “ultimate end of man” is always “conditioned by his nature,” Egbekpalu 
emphasizes. It thus differentiates him from “animals and inanimate objects.”33
Happiness is here understood as an “active state of life,” as the “vir-
tuous activity of the soul that presupposes reason,” as the “actualization 
of [man’s] potentialities.”34 Aristotle furthermore understands the “conative 
role of happiness” to be a man’s desire, namely “towards objects of action 
that sustain his persistence to maintain his existence.”35 Desire is here seen as 
an “activity of the soul” that is closely related to “human emotions,” Emelda 
Egbekpalu continues. The “cognitive, desiderative, affective aspects of man” 
equally have a “conative role” in Aristotle, she argues. They are apt to cause 
various “bodily changes, movements and behaviours,” they are thus “gener-
ally considered as survival mechanisms that motivate responsive behaviours 
to maintain existence,” Emelda Egbekpalu claims. Emotions in Aristotle thus 
“connote conative experiences.”36 Aristotle may understand virtuous acts to 
“culminate in cognitive activities,” Emelda Egbekpalu concedes, and she clos-
es with some considerations about what “other dimensions of human nature” 
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d. Conatus and the transition from the teleological to the deterministic view 
of nature
In his Nature’s Perfection: Aristotle and Descartes on Motion and Purpose, Jus-
tin Humphreys considers the transition from Aristotle’s teleological concep-
tion of nature to Descartes’ conception of nature as purposeless Humphreys 
argues that this shift is grounded not in empirical discovery, but instead in 
“differing conceptions of where perfection lies in nature.”37 In order to un-
dermine the teleology of Aristotle’s account of motion, Descartes needs to 
resort to a “theological doctrine,” namely one that “derives the principles of 
motion from the perfections of God.”38
Humphreys begins by introducing Aristotle’s account of motion in De 
caelo, focusing on the two kinds of motion Aristotle discusses here, circu-
lar, and rectilinear, and their importance for Aristotle’s distinction between 
superlunar and sublunar motion – a distinction that according to Humphreys 
sheds light on Aristotle’s conception of teleology. Aristotle here argues on 
Humphreys reading that circular motion is more “perfect” or “complete” than 
rectilinear motion and is thus “naturally prior.”39 Rectilinear motion, Hum-
phreys continues, is thus “ontologically dependent on the complete, circular 
motions of the heavens.”40 Humphreys then moves on the demonstrate that 
Aristotle’s division between two kinds of motion corresponds to an analo-
gous division in the heavens, namely between the sublunary and superlunary 
heavens41: Not only are “sublunary things” spatially lower, they are also “less 
complete and divine” and thus lower in an axiological sense. When it comes 
to the “epistemic status” of final causes, Humphreys continues, they are not 
grounded in empirical claims, but instead Aristotle puts forward “a wholly a 
priori thesis that derives from his conception of perfection.”42 Aristotle here 
presents an “axiological order of self-motion,” starting from the “perfect 
rotation of the first heaven,” moving down more complex heavenly bodies, 
and ultimately to earthly creatures, “who participate in the divine only by 
imitation.”43 Although bodies on all levels are “self-movers,” an ultimate ref-
erence to the “activities of eternal superlunary creatures” is required to at-
37 Justin Humphreys, “Nature’s Perfection: Aristotle and Descartes on Motion and Purpose,” 






43 Ibid., 97. 
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tribute purpose to sublunary creatures.44 The final ends of the latter are thus 
“conditioned by eternal motion” of superlunar substances, which possess “in-
herent circular motion” and are both “prior to them” and “more complete.”45
The paper then moves on to Descartes – whose conception of teleology 
diverges from Aristotle’s, in that Descartes’ account of the laws of nature de-
pends on a conception of perfection that is ultimately distinct from Aristot-
le’s. Descartes’ “banishes final causes from physics,”46 and his physics has thus 
been described as a “mathematization of nature” or a “geometricization of 
space.”47 Yet, Humphreys points out, in the Discourse, Descartes also appears 
to argue for the claim “that the metaphysical necessity of the laws of nature 
rests on the perfections of God.”48 Thus, Humphreys argues, the question of 
the relationship of mathematics to natural objects is in Descartes’ ontolo-
gy ultimately “rests on his theology.”49 In support of this claim, Humphreys 
points at the three fundamental laws of nature as Descartes presents them 
in the Principles and argues that they metaphysically equally “ground Des-
cartes’ dynamical laws in the perfections of God.”50 Descartes’ conception 
abandons the “Aristotelian separation of the heavens and the earth,”51 and 
of circular and rectilinear motion, instead requiring of the universe uniformity 
of motion. Descartes’ “theological foundation of physical law” with its ex-
clusion of final causes thus grounds the physics we find here, namely in the 
form of a “geometry of uniform space of extended objects.”52 Both Aristotle 
and Descartes thus agree that the “principles in natural science” ought to be 
derived from “aesthetic considerations about the perfection of nature.”53 The 
“metaphysical basis of their division,” however, is to be found in where they 
locate this perfection, Aristotle in the superlunar sphere, and Descartes in the 
deity, Humphreys argues. 
e. Back to teleology: A new reading of Spinoza’s conatus
In Spinoza’s Conatus: A Teleological Reading of Its Ethical Dimension, Neşe 
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represents a mechanistically motivated rejection of teleology. Instead, she 
argues that Spinoza’s conception of conatus remains close to a traditional 
notion of teleology, namely to what she calls a “mild approach”54 to te-
leology. Aksoy first discusses Spinoza’s approach to teleology, in order to 
then argue that this concept finds application when it comes to the conatus 
doctrine. Although Spinoza himself expressed a strongly critical attitude to-
wards teleology, Aksoy here argues that “Spinoza’s conception of conatus 
is teleological in character,” and that therefore his ethics include “objective, 
humanistic, and essentialist elements.”55 Aksoy builds here on recent work on 
Spinoza that argues against the received view – according to which “Spinoza 
dispenses with any form of teleology”56 – that Spinoza in fact does retain a 
notion of teleology, namely when it comes to the “explanation of human af-
fairs.”57 Spinoza, Aksoy agrees, has a “mild approach to human teleology.”58 
After discussing the weaknesses of several non-teleological readings of 
Spinoza’s argument, Aksoy concludes that conatus ought to be understood 
as more than a mere “blind (mechanical) impulse.”59 Instead, it is a “maximi-
zation of power towards certain [future] ends.”60 Importantly, the conatus 
argument according to Aksoy thus implies that “human beings are more than 
mechanical entities as they have certain ends and purposes of their own.”61
Aksoy then addresses the consequences that her understanding of co-
natus as manifesting a “weak teleology” has for ethicality. She here stresses 
the alleged “sharp contrast” between Spinoza’s understanding of ethicality 
as grounded in “the conative act of the ethical agent” and previous concep-
tions.62 Yet, with the understanding of conatus as possessing weak teleol-
ogy in hand, Aksoy here argues for an understanding of striving as directed 
“towards the ethical good,” namely “because of its conformity to the ideal 
human nature and vice versa.”63 Spinoza’s conatus doctrine thus represents 
what Aksoy calls “Ethical Objectivism,” she thus disagrees with positions 
such as Deleuze’s who see Spinoza embracing a radical subjectivism about 
54 Neşe Aksoy, “Spinoza’s Conatus: A Teleological Reading of Its Ethical Dimension,” Conatus 
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ethical concepts. Aksoy also argues that Spinoza represents a distinctive kind 
of humanism, and against the claim that Spinoza sees no difference between 
human and animal nature. On her “teleological reading of human conatus,” 
human beings occupy a “distinguished place in nature” as ethical subjects, for 
one thing, they have “autonomy of power compared to the other beings,” on 
Aksoy’s reading.64 Lastly, Aksoy identifies a distinctive kind of essentialism in 
the conatus doctrine, namely one that “considers human essence as an act of 
conative power.”65
f. Conatus vs. Habitus: Modernism beats postmodernism
Josep Maria Bech claims in his Spinoza’s Conatus Undoes Bourdieu’s Habitus that 
a closer look at Spinoza’s influence on Bourdieu’s thought “reveals a long-last-
ing inconsistency”66 in the latter’s conception of habitus, namely between a 
commitment to a strong conatus and a weak conatus. With the notion of a 
habitus already “staggering,” Bech claims that Bourdieu’s attempts to salvage 
it by means of the concept of conatus backfire to such an extent as to give it 
“an unsettling blow.”67 Bourdieu tried to employ the concept of conatus in two 
ultimately contradictory ways: First, Bech argues, Bourdieu used the notion 
of conatus in order to ground his notion of a habitus, thereby endorsing what 
Bech dubs a strong conatus, “i.e., a sort of ‘engine of the habitus’ endowed 
with un-revisable strength and impervious to the resistances it will eventually 
encounter.”68 But second, from 1987 on, Bourdieu also used the concept of co-
natus in a weak way, namely in order to “reinstat[e] agency in the structuralist 
mindset.”69 The weak conatus required here is one that is “revisable,” namely 
once it is “exposed to the interfering resistance of exterior forces.”70 
Bech here argues that the latter, weak, conatus is “congruent […] with Spi-
noza’s doctrine,” whereas the former, strong, conatus represents a “misread-
ing of Spinoza” on Bourdieu’s part.71 Bourdieu himself realized the problem 
in 1993, Bech claims, and as a result modified his account by “subordinating 
conatus to habitus.”72 Bourdieu’s two inconsistent notions of conatus are also 
64 Ibid., 124.
65 Ibid., 126.
66 Josep Maria Bech, “Spinoza’s Conatus Undoes Bourdieu’s Habitus,” Conatus – Journal of 





71 Ibid., 132, 136.
72 Ibid., 132.
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reflected in his varying attempts to defend voluntarism on the one, and deter-
minism on the other hand.73 Bech ultimately argues that the notion of conatus, 
as Bourdieu uses it, “acts as a litmus test” when it comes to identifying the 
“ambiguities and shortcomings of th[e] notion”74 of habitus.
g. Conatus in German idealism: The Streben of the Fichtean I
In Streben of the I as the Fundamental Form of Consciousness, Andrija Jurić ar-
gues that Fichte’s notion of “striving” of the I is a “necessary condition of finite 
or individual consciousness.”75 The I thus possesses a “dual nature,” one that is 
both finite, and yet striving towards the infinite – with the resulting tension be-
ing the “moving force of the I.”76 Jurić stresses a reading of the I in Fichte’s Wis-
senschaftslehre as a “concrete and individually existing I” and of the absolute I 
as that at which this concrete I strives. For the I to exist concretely, however, it 
needs to “be in tension and contradiction between its finite and infinite activi-
ty.”77 The I is “always activity” and at the same time a product of this activity.78 
It is thus, “activity itself.” Positing the I at the same time requires positing what 
is not-I, “therefore, if we have one activity, we immediately have two.”79
Jurić then moves on to the topic of striving itself and argues that the “striv-
ing of the I must be infinite,”80 it is the precondition for positing any objects 
whatsoever. The purpose of striving in Fichte is then, Jurić argues, the “filling 
out” of infinity. Yet, for there to be an I, “this undefined and undetermined ac-
tivity that strives towards infinity needs to be limited.”81 Limiting the “infinite 
tendency” is required if the self is to posit itself. Thus, although the Self posits 
itself absolutely, it does not do so “in an undetermined way,” as Jurić puts it.82 
In Fichte’s terminology, Jurić argues, the Anstoss is what puts such lim-
itations on infinity. Denoting both obstacle, hindrance, and also impulse or 
stimulus, Anstoss “puts a task or demand” on the I to limit itself. It thus does 
not limit the I directly, Jurić argues. It rather motivates the I to “self-limita-
73 Ibid. 14.
74 Ibid. 14.
75 Andrija Jurić, “Streben of the I as the Fundamental Form of Consciousness,” Conatus – Jour-
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tion.”83 Yet, Anstoss can only occur in the presence on an “infinite activity 
of the I.”84 Ultimately, “infinite striving of the I” on the one, and Anstoss are 
thus mutually dependent. In fact, we find here what Jurić calls a “dialectic of 
infinity and Anstoss”85: Unless the I strives “outwards,” it cannot be anges-
tossen. Anstoss is thus what Jurić calls a “re-action” of the activity of the I. 
As such it is spontaneous and not necessarily under voluntary control. Yet, it 
is not “mindless,” as long as it is capable of “return[ing] into itself.”86 Conse-
quently, the self is of a divided character by necessity, namely split “between 
its finite and infinite activity.”87 What ultimately constitutes the I however, 
according to Jurić’s conclusion, is striving, and it is thus no coincidence that 
the duality of the self, together with the “dialectic between infinity and fini-
tude” and others, lie at the heart of Fichte’s philosophy.88 
h. Hegel’s legacy: Max Stirner’s Ego and its conatus
In At War in Swaddling Clothes: Stiner’s Unique One as a Conative Existence, 
Kostas Galanopoulos argues that the Stirnerian egoist – in his striving that 
is the “fulfillment as the Unique One through ownership” – manifests what 
Galanopoulos calls “the Stirnerian notion of conatus.”89 Moreover, Gala-
nopoulos argues the animosity between individuals that the Stirnerian egoist 
confronts is both an “ontological precondition and prefiguration of cona-
tus’ conclusion.”90 Galanopoulos begins by outlining Stirner’s reception of 
conatus in Spinoza’s thought, particularly “through its Hegelian interpreta-
tion,”91 and in Hobbes’s “individualistic ontology.” He argues that whatever 
the differences between Spinoza and Hobbes may be, they concur on the 
importance of rejecting freedom of the will. They thus leave no room for hu-
man exceptionalism, according to Galanopoulos. Stirner’s own “thoughts on 
man” start out from “man as a newborn existence in the world.”92 From birth 
on, man is at war with the surrounding world, “the striving for persistence” is 







89 Kostas Galanopoulos. “At War in Swaddling Clothes. Stiner’s Unique One as a Conative 
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The “constant combat” that man finds himself in is thus “about the co-
natus.”93 According to Stirnerian egoism, the individual “consumes whatever 
is in its power and moves inwards in order to become the Unique One.”94 In 
direct continuation of the combat situation that the newborn finds himself 
in, the Stirnerian egoist thus understands everything surrounding him as a 
“potential possession” for him to consume and to expand himself into. We 
hence find here what Galanopoulos calls an “unlimited and dynamic notion 
of ownership” – the exact “reverse of the Kantian imperative.”95 According 
to Galanopoulos, there exists therefore an important continuity, namely “the 
same conatus” that also “obliged the child to be at war” from the moment 
he was born.
Ultimately, the Stirnerian egoist will also need to “live within a specific 
dominion, within a State,” and he will here equally confront the need to en-
gage in “political struggle to defend and preserve his ownership.”96 When it 
comes to the political level, Galanopoulos claims in closing, the insurrection 
is in fact that “‘political’ application of the Stirnerian conatus.”97
i. Conatus and Dasein
In Conatus and Dasein: The Problem of an Existential Theory of Motivation, 
Marko Markič argues in support of an understanding of Befindlichkeit, finding-
ness, of Dasein in Heidegger as a “specific existential drive,”98 as a “conative 
principle.”99
Dasein always “announces itself in connection with the meaningful struc-
ture of the world,” it thus cannot be captured “for itself in its own existence,” 
Markič points out. Instead, it is “always determined by its relation to being.”100 
The finitude of Dasein grounds this relational structure, in the “groundless 
thrownness.”101 Findingness of existence, Markič argues, here functions as a 






98 Marko Markič, “Conatus and Dasein: The Problem of an Existential Theory of Motivation,” 
Conatus – Journal of Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2021): 193.
99 Ibid., 199.
100 Ibid., 194.
101 Ibid., 195; see also 203. 
102 Ibid., 199.
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tion. It is thus “not some self-grounded entity.”103 Dasein is instead “constant 
self-calling-into-existence” and “constantly having to exist.”104 Throwness is 
thus a “motivational principle,” and not merely a “fact about existence.”105 
Findingness, on Markič’s account, thus possesses a “dynamic structure.”106
Markič considers the concepts of understanding and care, and then es-
pecially the problem of authentic motivation in Heidegger, and in particular 
the question of how to “practically understand” the concept in the context 
of the “perspective of life-world interactions.”107 Authenticity in Heidegger 
amounts to “taking upon oneself the groundless freedom of one’s existence,” 
Markič claims. Building on Dilthey’s account of hermeneutics, it is the “free-
dom of the interpretation always starting from existence itself, not from the 
life-world.”108 Of particular importance for the existential analysis is authen-
tic motivation, Markič continues. An authentic existence preserves the “moti-
vationally structured problematic openness,” authentic findingness thus “dil-
atates that it has to always gain it back anew.”109
j. Beyond the biological givenness – Conatus and meaning
In The Erotic and the Eternal: Striving for the Permanence of Meaning, Beatrice 
Kobow presents three different conceptions of conatus, all of which manifest 
a “will to persist” that goes beyond “mere biological givenness,”110 and that 
instead primarily reflect the individual’s participation in a culture or other 
collective. Both Plato, Heidegger, and Scheler describe “human strife” as an 
activity that occurs within a collective, Kobow argues. Conatus is here “an 
aspect of the permanence of meaning” that is “constitutive of human society 
and culture.”111 
In Plato’s Symposium, the origin of human striving is described “through 
the myth of the personified Eros.”112 The “persistence of man” is thus under-
stood as an “individual’s endeavour” here, Kobow argues. Just as man may 
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towards the Truth.”113 The “erotic strife” that we find in the Symposium is thus 
one for “immortality,”114 Kobow concludes. And she moves on to reject fem-
inist concerns with the “exclusion of the feminine” when it comes to striving 
in the Symposium. Instead, Kobow argues, the Symposium does not only deny 
a “substantial role” to women in particular, but in fact to “all individuals as 
individuals.”115 In Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, the sixth chapter addresses the 
topic of “Sorge,” care. “Sorge” has a double meaning, Kobow points out, in 
that it means both “Besorgnis,” “Bekümmernis” and also “Für-Sorge.”116 It is 
thus “more than effortful striving,” Kobow emphasizes. Heidegger here un-
derstands the “perfectio of humans as accomplishment of ‘care.’”117 “Sorge” 
always has an “aspect of futurity and anticipation,”118 Kobow continues, and 
is thus intimately related to other central themes in Heidegger, such as his 
thought about despair and the historicity of Dasein. In the third and last po-
sition that Kobow discusses, Scheler’s Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 
we find a “unified, non-reductivist (non-vitalist) understanding of human be-
ings.”119 Life is characterized “by certain ‘objective’ properties” but also by 
an “inner sense” in which “the ‘self’ is experiencing life,” an “Innesein.”120 Hu-
mans can “negate their environment,” and they are at the same time “world-
open.” Yet the “urge” (Gefühlsdrang) and other phenomena that we find here 
are not merely a matter of “addition,” Kobow argues. Humans are “guided 
by spirit” and those always “categorically different from all manifestations 
of life Scheler thus has a “cosmological conception” of Geist, Kobow con-
cludes.
k. Overcoming Spinoza’s conatus: Dewey’s concept of democratic education
In their A New Conatus for the New World: Dewey’s Response to Perfectionist 
Conceptions of Democratic Education, Özel, Beisecker, and Ervin question the 
claim that Spinoza’s perfectionist conception of education, with the strength-
ening of the student’s individual conatus as its goal, is particularly suitable for 
democratic social ideas. Instead, they contrast Spinoza’s focus on rational ac-
tivation in his educational thought with Dewey’s conception of education. We 
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values, specifically when it comes to the “overall aims of schooling.”121 Educa-
tion does not merely aim at individual perfection as it does in Spinoza, instead, 
Dewey claims that education involves acquiring a second nature, namely one that 
reflects “the norms and expectations of one’s specific community.”122
The authors begin by questioning the claim recent scholars have made, name-
ly that Spinoza “usher[ed] in a form of radical humanism,” one that is “distinctly 
favorable to democratic ideals.”123 Spinoza’s educational thought is focused on 
the “perfection of the rational nature of individuals,” on the strengthening of 
their conatus. Spinoza may thus have been a “pioneer” or a “radical” when it 
comes to the central position that the individual, “at the expense of any deity or 
community,” plays, the authors agree. Yet, Özel, Beisecker, and Ervin argue, the 
understanding of perfection that we find in the Ethics is an anemic one, largely 
characterized in terms of “independence, or absence of dependence.”124 What 
“fade[s] away” under this conception, the authors argue, are “social aspects.”125 
Education may have positive social consequences in Spinoza’s conception, but 
these are no more than a “happy byproduct,”126 the authors argue. 
In Dewey’s Democracy and Education, the authors continue, we find a strik-
ingly different conception from Spinoza’s, especially when it comes to the aims 
of education. Instead of focusing on the promoting the student’s independence, 
Dewey sees interdependence as the main goal of education. Education is sup-
posed to enable lifelong growth of the individual within the society they live 
in. Instead of raising and “egoistic specialist,” the educator should direct their 
attention at “fostering joint intentions, both as means and ends” of their instruc-
tions.127 “Social factors,” Özel, Beisecker, and Ervin argue, thus “feature much 
more prominently” here than in Spinoza. Education is a “necessity of life” in com-
plex societies, Dewey argues, and it is of equal importance for the “formation of 
community” in the first place.128 Some ends of education can thus not be “found 
within,” as Spinoza claims, but only within society as a whole, they thus require 
“continuous readjustment.”129
121 Jasmin Özel, Dave Beisecker, and Joe Ervin, “A New Conatus for the New World: Dewey’s 
Response to Perfectionist Conceptions of Democratic Education,” Conatus – Journal of Philos-
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III. Epilogue: The conatus of conatus
The papers collected in this issue demonstrate that the philosophical 
treatment and the importance of conatus are far from being exhausted. 
As a fundamental trait of monadic existence the conatus is manifested in 
a multiplicity of facets that sustain the persistence of any real existence. 
It is thus obvious that there is still a vast field of such manifestations of 
conatus that awaits philosophical exploration, especially in the realms of 
Social Ontology and of the Philosophy of Nature. Is, for example, the his-
torical phenomenon of empires that survive for centuries a manifestation 
of conatus? And can time itself be conceived as the ultimate manifesta-
tion of conatus in the universe?
We hope that the present collection will carry on the intellectual momen-
tum for addressing these questions – and many more to come.
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